Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.01.001zbMath1409.91095OpenAlexW2570162583MaRDI QIDQ523501

René Kirkegaard

Publication date: 21 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.001

zbMATH Keywords

first-order approachmoral hazardprincipal-agent modelsspanning condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items (4)

Endogenous criteria for success ⋮ A general solution method for moral hazard problems ⋮ Moral hazard with limited liability: random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures ⋮ Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach

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