Committee design with endogenous participation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.01.009zbMath1409.91092OpenAlexW2163380118MaRDI QIDQ523502

Volker Hahn

Publication date: 21 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.uni-konstanz.de/FuF/wiwi/workingpaperseries/WP_12-Hahn_2013.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionscreeningtransparencyefficiency wagescareer concernscommittee decision-making

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Cites Work

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• Information acquisition and transparency in committees
• A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees
• Rational ignorance and voting behavior
• Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?
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• Committees with leaks
• A crash course in implementation theory
• A Remark on Stirling's Formula
• Wages as Sorting Mechanisms in Competitive Markets with Asymmetric Information: A Theory of Testing
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information

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