Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.01.010zbMath1409.91031OpenAlexW2586229362MaRDI QIDQ523503

Ronald Stauber

Publication date: 21 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.010

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguitybackward inductionmaxminextensive games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (1)

A strategic product for belief functions

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players
• Ellsberg games
• Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
• Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity
• Ambiguous act equilibria
• Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
• Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information
• A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity
• Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty
• Comparing three ways to update Choquet beliefs
• Correlated Nash equilibrium
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The chain store paradox
• Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
• Extensive form games with uncertainty averse players
• Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty: Breaking down backward induction
• Equilibrium in beliefs under uncertainty
• Recursive multiple-priors.
• Ambiguous games
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• The one-shot-deviation principle for sequential rationality
• Non-additive beliefs and strategic equilibria
• A note on Kuhn's theorem with ambiguity averse players
• Dynamic choice under ambiguity
• Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium: Definition and Computational Complexity
• Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria
• Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
• A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity
• OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM IN GAMES
• Game Theory
• Set-valued analysis

This page was built for publication: Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games