At-will relationships: how an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.02.007zbMath1409.91079OpenAlexW2592122382MaRDI QIDQ523516

Alistair J. Wilson, Hong Wu

Publication date: 21 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.007

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesimperfect public monitoringdissolution clausesendogenous terminationoutside options

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (2)

Asymmetrical expectations of future interaction and cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Repeated interaction and its impact on cooperation and surplus allocation -- an experimental analysis

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