Taking turns

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.003zbMath1409.91033OpenAlexW4234790354MaRDI QIDQ523521

Greg Leo

Publication date: 21 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.003

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesmechanism designex post incentive compatibilitytaking turns

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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