The strategically ignorant principal
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Publication:523523
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.010zbMath1409.91161OpenAlexW2593243513MaRDI QIDQ523523
Publication date: 21 April 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.010
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Cites Work
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- Arm's Length Relationships
- Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
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