Interim third-party selection in bargaining
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Publication:523532
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.02.013zbMath1409.91121OpenAlexW3125954993MaRDI QIDQ523532
Publication date: 21 April 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.013
Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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