Dynamic Double Auctions: Towards First Best

DOI10.1137/1.9781611975482.11zbMath1435.91093OpenAlexW4231927727MaRDI QIDQ5236192

Renato Paes Leme, Song Zuo, Santiago R. Balseiro, Vahab S. Mirrokni

Publication date: 15 October 2019

Published in: Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975482.11

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designtwo-sided marketsdynamic double auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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