Correlation-Robust Analysis of Single Item Auction

DOI10.1137/1.9781611975482.13zbMath1435.91094OpenAlexW4253613906MaRDI QIDQ5236194

Xiaohui Bei, Pinyan Lu, Zhihao Gavin Tang, N. V. Gravin

Publication date: 15 October 2019

Published in: Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975482.13

zbMATH Keywords

single-item auctioncorrelation robust-frameworksequential posted-price mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Correlation-robust auction design ⋮ Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posted pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching ⋮ Lookahead auctions with pooling ⋮ Approximation algorithms for the partial assignment problem ⋮ Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion

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