Tight Revenue Gaps among Simple Mechanisms

DOI10.1137/1.9781611975482.14zbMath1435.91062OpenAlexW2796255560MaRDI QIDQ5236195

Tao Xiao, Pinyan Lu, Zhihao Gavin Tang, Yaonan Jin

Publication date: 15 October 2019

Published in: Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975482.14

zbMATH Keywords

Myerson auctionsequential posted-pricinganonymous posted-pricingsecond-price auction with anonymous reserve

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (5)

Optimal pricing for MHR distributions ⋮ Approximation algorithms for the partial assignment problem ⋮ Tight Revenue Gaps Among Simple Mechanisms ⋮ Separation between second price auctions with personalized reserves and the revenue optimal auction ⋮ On the approximability of simple mechanisms for MHR distributions

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