DEA models for two decision makers with conflicts: the principal-agent problem
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5242262
DOI10.1051/ro/2018052zbMath1423.90113OpenAlexW2810395802MaRDI QIDQ5242262
Linlin Zhao, Yuandong Gu, Liang Liang, Yong Zha
Publication date: 6 November 2019
Published in: RAIRO - Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2018052
Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Special problems of linear programming (transportation, multi-index, data envelopment analysis, etc.) (90C08)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Measuring the efficiency of decision making units
- Benchmarking with quality-adjusted DEA (Q-DEA) to seek lower-cost high-quality service: evidence from a U.S.bank application
- Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
- Radial DEA models without inputs or without outputs
- Handbook on data envelopment analysis
- Environmental efficiency analysis based on relational two-stage DEA model
- Flexible measures in production process: A DEA-based approach
- Incorporating Multiprocess Performance Standards into the DEA Framework
- A Dynamic Principal-Agent Model with Hidden Information: Sequential Optimality Through Truthful State Revelation
- DEA models for two-stage processes: Game approach and efficiency decomposition
- The Firm as a Communication Network
This page was built for publication: DEA models for two decision makers with conflicts: the principal-agent problem