Renegotiation‐proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification

DOI10.3982/TE3190;zbMath1427.91141MaRDI QIDQ5243597

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Publication date: 19 November 2019

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/3190/24492/716

zbMATH Keywords

verificationmechanism designrenegotiation proof

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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