Truthful Generalized Assignments via Stable Matching

DOI10.1287/moor.2013.0625zbMath1307.91133OpenAlexW2143684800MaRDI QIDQ5244865

Ning Chen, Pinyan Lu, N. V. Gravin

Publication date: 31 March 2015

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2013.0625

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designstable matchinggeneralized assignment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

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