A New Approach to the Pareto Stable Matching Problem

DOI10.1287/moor.2013.0627zbMath1308.91120OpenAlexW2130587418MaRDI QIDQ5244872

Naoyuki Kamiyama

Publication date: 31 March 2015

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2324/24491

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto efficiencystable matchingmany-to-many matching market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (4)

Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems ⋮ Pareto efficient matchings with pairwise preferences ⋮ Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences ⋮ Pareto Stable Matchings under One-Sided Matroid Constraints

Cites Work

• The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences
• Stable marriage and indifference
• Combinatorial optimization. Polyhedra and efficiency (3 volumes)
• Two-sided matching with indifferences
• Reducing rank-maximal to maximum weight matching
• Rank-maximal matchings
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• A Faster Strongly Polynomial Minimum Cost Flow Algorithm
• Efficient Algorithms for Weighted Rank-Maximal Matchings and Related Problems
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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