Complete Versus Partial Collusion in Competing Coalitions

DOI10.1142/S021919891540006XzbMath1312.91036OpenAlexW2053255731MaRDI QIDQ5245036

Omkar D. Palsule-Desai

Publication date: 1 April 2015

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919891540006x

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitygame theorycompetitioncoalitionsharing rulesintensity of collusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (1)

Impact of equity and equality on stability and collusion in a decentralized network

Cites Work

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• Bertrand colludes more than Cournot
• COALITION FORMATION GAMES: A SURVEY
• Stable Cartels
• ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF COALITIONS

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