PEOPLE WITH COMMON PRIORS CAN AGREE TO DISAGREE

DOI10.1017/S1755020314000380zbMath1371.03020OpenAlexW2313484396MaRDI QIDQ5247342

Harvey Lederman

Publication date: 24 April 2015

Published in: The Review of Symbolic Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020314000380

zbMATH Keywords

rationalitycommon knowledgeagreementAumann's key conditional

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (2)

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Cites Work

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• Common Priors: A Reply to Gul

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