Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities
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Publication:5247606
DOI10.1287/moor.2014.0662zbMath1310.91110OpenAlexW2166100185MaRDI QIDQ5247606
Publication date: 24 April 2015
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2014.0662
strategy-proofnessschool choiceindivisible objects allocationdeferred-acceptance mechanismmultiple tie-breaking
Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
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