Optimal Design for Multi-Item Auctions: A Robust Optimization Approach

DOI10.1287/moor.2014.0645zbMath1312.91054OpenAlexW2170894177MaRDI QIDQ5247609

Chaithanya Bandi, Dimitris J. Bertsimas

Publication date: 24 April 2015

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2014.0645

zbMATH Keywords

robust optimizationmechanism designoptimal auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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