Fairness Norms Can Explain the Emergence of Specific Cooperation Norms in the Battle of the Prisoner's Dilemma

DOI10.1080/0022250X.2014.897948zbMath1315.91014OpenAlexW2242598875MaRDI QIDQ5248050

Fabian Winter

Publication date: 27 April 2015

Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2014.897948

zbMATH Keywords

experimentnormssocial dilemmas

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Rawlsian altruism with perfect discrimination leads to social efficiency

Cites Work

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• Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations
• Finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments without a commonly known end
• When does the game end? Public goods experiments with non-definite and non-commonly known time horizons
• The impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on contributions in best-shot public good games
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Inequality and Procedural Justice in Social Dilemmas
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation

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