Flexibility in a Stackelberg leadership with differentiated goods

DOI10.1080/02331934.2013.836649zbMath1310.91094OpenAlexW2038329938MaRDI QIDQ5248208

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Publication date: 28 April 2015

Published in: Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repositorio.inesctec.pt/handle/123456789/6133

zbMATH Keywords

game theorydifferentiationperfect Bayesian equilibriumdemand uncertaintyStackelberg model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (5)

A Hotelling-Type Network ⋮ An Economical Model For Dumping by Dumping in a Cournot Model ⋮ Localization and prices in the quadratic Hotelling model with uncertainty ⋮ Bilevel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, Applications and a Bibliography ⋮ On the selection of leader in Stackelberg games with parameter uncertainty

Cites Work

• Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
• Cournot duopoly with two production periods and cost differentials
• Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
• Innovation timing games: a general framework with applications
• First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
• First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information
• Big fish eat small fish: on merger in Stackelberg markets

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