Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities
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Publication:524960
DOI10.1007/s00182-015-0487-5zbMath1388.91027OpenAlexW2253384167MaRDI QIDQ524960
Publication date: 27 April 2017
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0487-5
ordinal gamesbargaining with claimscore stable partitionsgames with non-transferable utility in partition function form
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