Approximate robustness of equilibrium to incomplete information

DOI10.1007/s00182-015-0488-4zbMath1388.91011OpenAlexW1183172928MaRDI QIDQ524961

Ori Haimanko, Atsushi Kajii

Publication date: 27 April 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1209.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

robustnesszero-sum gamesincomplete informationBayesian Nash equilibriumupper hemicontinuity\(\varepsilon\)-equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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