Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games

DOI10.1007/s00182-015-0498-2zbMath1388.91049OpenAlexW1526367993MaRDI QIDQ524971

Juan I. Block, David K. Levine

Publication date: 27 April 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/260376

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gameapproximate equilibriumfolk theoremself-referential game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Program equilibrium
• The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
• The evolution of cooperation through imitation
• Reciprocal contracting
• Approximate implementation in Markovian environments
• A commitment folk theorem
• An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
• Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
• Definable and Contractible Contracts
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Contractible Contracts in Common Agency Problems
• The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
• Promises and Partnership
• Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games

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