Generalized reinforcement learning in perfect-information games

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0499-1zbMath1388.91061OpenAlexW2204752233MaRDI QIDQ524974

Maxwell Pak, Bing Xu

Publication date: 27 April 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0499-1

zbMATH Keywords

reinforcement learningextensive-form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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