Incentivizing advertiser networks to submit multiple bids

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0501-YzbMath1388.91109OpenAlexW1783515297MaRDI QIDQ524978

R. Preston McAfee, Patrick Hummel, Sergei Vassilvitskii

Publication date: 27 April 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0501-y

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsadvertiser networksadvertising exchanges

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders
• Ranking asymmetric auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Glimpses of Benoît Mandelbrot (1924--2010)

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