On the Lattice Structure of Stable Allocations in a Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market
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Publication:5252230
DOI10.1287/moor.2014.0679zbMath1312.91072OpenAlexW1996634144MaRDI QIDQ5252230
Publication date: 29 May 2015
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/f7341ace2058bff39b8e0288a93a7479ea54b75e
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