Patent Licensing: Stackelberg Versus Cournot Models

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-01411-1_23zbMath1315.91043OpenAlexW377669739MaRDI QIDQ5261495

Flávio Ferreira, Oana Ruxandra Tuns (Bode)

Publication date: 3 July 2015

Published in: Discontinuity and Complexity in Nonlinear Physical Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01411-1_23

zbMATH Keywords

optimizationlicensingindustrial organizationdifferentiated Stackelberg modeldifferentiated Cournot model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Licensing endogenous cost-reduction in a differentiated Stackelberg model
• Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• On the dynamic efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria
• On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
• Licensing in an International Competition with Differentiated Goods

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