Efficient stabilization of cooperative matching games

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2017.03.020zbMath1371.91135OpenAlexW2602878496MaRDI QIDQ526875

Naonori Kakimura, Naoyuki Kamiyama, Takehiro Ito, Yusuke Kobayashi, Yoshio Okamoto

Publication date: 15 May 2017

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2017.03.020

zbMATH Keywords

matchingcorecooperative gamesolution conceptGallai-Edmonds decompositionnetwork bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (9)

Stabilizing Network Bargaining Games by Blocking Players ⋮ Additive stabilizers for unstable graphs ⋮ Stabilization of capacitated matching games ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Minimum cost stability in exchange networks ⋮ Graph Stabilization: A Survey ⋮ Stabilizing network bargaining games by blocking players ⋮ Stabilizing Weighted Graphs ⋮ Answers set programs for non-transferable utility games: expressiveness, complexity and applications

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