DEALING WITH MONOTONICITY CONSTRAINTS IN SCREENING PROBLEMS: THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL

DOI10.17654/MS101020215zbMath1366.91107OpenAlexW3122934507MaRDI QIDQ5269530

X. Ruiz del Portal

Publication date: 27 June 2017

Published in: Far East Journal of Mathematical Sciences (FJMS) (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.pphmj.com/abstract/10469.htm

zbMATH Keywords

optimal control theorymonotonicity constraintsoptimal contractscreening problemswell-behaved solutions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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