A Generalization of Nash Bargaining and Proportional Fairness to Log-Convex Utility Sets With Power Constraints

DOI10.1109/TIT.2011.2132470zbMath1366.91090OpenAlexW2149859242MaRDI QIDQ5273598

Holger Boche, Martin Schubert

Publication date: 12 July 2017

Published in: IEEE Transactions on Information Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1109/tit.2011.2132470

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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