Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid electricity market: Part 1 – existence and characterization

DOI10.1080/02331934.2016.1227981zbMath1369.91144OpenAlexW2535964670MaRDI QIDQ5277992

Pascale Bendotti, Miroslav Pištěk, Didier Aussel

Publication date: 12 July 2017

Published in: Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/02331934.2016.1227981

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumelectricity marketbest responsemulti-leader-follower game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (14)

Solving quadratic multi-leader-follower games by smoothing the follower's best response ⋮ Evolutionary variational inequality formulation of the generalized Nash equilibrium problem ⋮ On the existence of projected solutions of quasi-variational inequalities and generalized Nash equilibrium problems ⋮ A special three-level optimization problem ⋮ Multiscale control of Stackelberg games ⋮ Value at risk approach to producer's best response in an electricity market with uncertain demand ⋮ Projected solutions for generalized quasivariational inequalities without compact constraint multimap ⋮ On an equilibrium problem with complementarity constraints formulation of pay-as-clear electricity market with demand elasticity ⋮ Optimizing power generation in the presence of micro-grids ⋮ A tractable multi-leader multi-follower peak-load-pricing model with strategic interaction ⋮ On Stackelberg–Nash Equilibria in Bilevel Optimization Games ⋮ A Short State of the Art on Multi-Leader-Follower Games ⋮ Regularization and Approximation Methods in Stackelberg Games and Bilevel Optimization ⋮ Bilevel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, Applications and a Bibliography

Cites Work

• Electricity spot market with transmission losses
• Deregulated electricity markets with thermal losses and production bounds: models and optimality conditions
• Analysis of M-stationary points to an EPEC modeling oligopolistic competition in an electricity spot market
• On Cournot Equilibria in Electricity Transmission Networks
• Using EPECs to Model Bilevel Games in Restructured Electricity Markets with Locational Prices

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