How to do comparative dynamics on the back of an envelope for open‐loop Nash equilibria in differential game theory
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Publication:5280138
DOI10.1002/oca.2264zbMath1370.49033OpenAlexW2478745965MaRDI QIDQ5280138
Publication date: 20 July 2017
Published in: Optimal Control Applications and Methods (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/oca.2264
Noncooperative games (91A10) Differential games and control (49N70) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Applications of game theory (91A80) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)
Related Items (2)
Comparative Dynamics and Envelope Theorems of Open-Loop Stackelberg Equilibria in Differential Games ⋮ Comparative dynamics in differential games: a note on the differentiability of solutions
Cites Work
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- Using Full Duality to Show that Simultaneously Additive Direct and Indirect Utilities Implies Unitary Price Elasticity of Demand
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