Tight Inefficiency Bounds for Perception-Parameterized Affine Congestion Games

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_32zbMath1422.91150arXiv1701.07614OpenAlexW2580025469MaRDI QIDQ5283383

Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer

Publication date: 21 July 2017

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1701.07614

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On the performance of approximate equilibria in congestion games
• Path deviations outperform approximate stability in heterogeneous congestion games
• Potential games
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• Taxes for linear atomic congestion games
• The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
• The Curse of Sequentiality in Routing Games
• The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
• Efficient Computation of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion Games

This page was built for publication: Tight Inefficiency Bounds for Perception-Parameterized Affine Congestion Games