Existence of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies Remains Hard to Decide for a Wide Range of Payoff Values

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_35zbMath1487.91012arXiv1701.08108OpenAlexW2584180193MaRDI QIDQ5283386

Themistoklis Melissourgos, Paul G. Spirakis

Publication date: 21 July 2017

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1701.08108

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexitygame theoryevolutionarily stable strategiesrobust reduction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

Existence of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies Remains Hard to Decide for a Wide Range of Payoff Values

Cites Work

• The computational complexity of evolutionarily stable strategies
• The complexity of facets (and some facets of complexity)
• Evolutionarily stable strategies of random games, and the vertices of random polygons
• Non-cooperative games
• The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
• Existence of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies Remains Hard to Decide for a Wide Range of Payoff Values
• Maxima for Graphs and a New Proof of a Theorem of Turán
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

This page was built for publication: Existence of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies Remains Hard to Decide for a Wide Range of Payoff Values