Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms – Two players case

DOI10.3233/COM-160064zbMath1367.91078MaRDI QIDQ5283446

Anat Lerner, Rica Gonen

Publication date: 21 July 2017

Published in: Computability (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto efficiencydictatorshipincentive compatibilitybudget constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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