Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games
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Publication:5286045
DOI10.2307/2951552zbMath0793.90100OpenAlexW1996328213MaRDI QIDQ5286045
George J. Mailath, Jeroen M. Swinkels, Larry Samuelson
Publication date: 29 June 1993
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/70ea0062a97c33167481b553cc8cfc0494bade4f
subgame perfectionextensive form gamessequential equilibriumforward inductioninformation setssubgamesstrategic independence
Related Items (14)
The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint ⋮ How proper is sequential equilibrium? ⋮ Order independence for iterated weak dominance ⋮ The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game ⋮ Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models ⋮ Forward induction equilibrium ⋮ Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies ⋮ On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response ⋮ Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms ⋮ Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction ⋮ Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk ⋮ Extensive form games with uncertainty averse players ⋮ On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability ⋮ On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
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