Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games

DOI10.2307/2951553zbMath0799.90135OpenAlexW2072410819MaRDI QIDQ5286046

Vijay Krishna, Jean-Pierre Benoît

Publication date: 29 June 1993

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951553

zbMATH Keywords

finitely repeated gamesrenegotiationperfect equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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