Deprecated: $wgMWOAuthSharedUserIDs=false is deprecated, set $wgMWOAuthSharedUserIDs=true, $wgMWOAuthSharedUserSource='local' instead [Called from MediaWiki\HookContainer\HookContainer::run in /var/www/html/w/includes/HookContainer/HookContainer.php at line 135] in /var/www/html/w/includes/Debug/MWDebug.php on line 372
Piecewise Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimation in Empirical Models of Auctions - MaRDI portal

Piecewise Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimation in Empirical Models of Auctions

From MaRDI portal
Publication:5287221

DOI10.2307/2526953zbMath0771.90020OpenAlexW1967182879MaRDI QIDQ5287221

Stephen G. Donald, Harry J. Paarsch

Publication date: 15 August 1993

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/964fdd663ab1519eb6d0a9531161f11c9ff4db67




Related Items

Identification and estimation in sequential, asymmetric, English auctionsSemiparametric identification and estimation in multi-object, English auctionsNonparametric likelihood ratio model selection tests between parametric likelihood and moment condition modelsSimulation based selection of competing structural econometric modelsOptimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspectiveExtremal quantile regressionGMM quantile regressionUnobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominanceNonparametric ``regression when errors are positioned at end-pointsHow accurately do structural asymmetric first-price auction estimates represent true valuations?Flexible Bayesian analysis of first price auctions using a simulated likelihoodUsing all bids in parametric estimation of first-price auctionsIDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION IN A THIRD-PRICE AUCTION MODELPiecewise pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation for risk aversion case in first-price sealed-bid auctionQuantile regression models with factor‐augmented predictors and information criterionSemiparametric estimation in models of first-price, sealed-bid auctions with affiliationInformation acquisition and/or bid preparation: a structural analysis of entry and bidding in timber sale auctionsBayesian estimation approaches to first-price auctionsIndirect inference in structural econometric modelsBayesian beta regression for bounded responses with unknown supportsEstimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: a misclassification approachLikelihood Estimation for Censored Random VectorsSuperconsistent estimation and inference in structural econometric models using extreme order statistics.Structural Econometric Methods in Auctions: A Guide to the LiteratureEconometrics of first-price auctions with entry and binding reservation prices




This page was built for publication: Piecewise Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimation in Empirical Models of Auctions