Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games

DOI10.2307/2951777zbMath0776.90095OpenAlexW1960974220MaRDI QIDQ5289299

Rafael Rob, George J. Mailath, Michihiro Kandori

Publication date: 22 August 1993

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951777

zbMATH Keywords

noiseMarkov chainslearningequilibrium selectionbounded rationalitymutationsrisk-dominanceevolutionary modelsymmetric strict Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

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