Incentive and quality assurance: an agency theoretical perspective

DOI10.1080/00207729308949556zbMath0774.90011OpenAlexW2000274360WikidataQ126249321 ScholiaQ126249321MaRDI QIDQ5289316

Yeong Ling Yang

Publication date: 23 August 1993

Published in: International Journal of Systems Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00207729308949556

zbMATH Keywords

just-in-timequalityquantity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production models (90B30) Application models in control theory (93C95) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cites Work

• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Risk Aversion and the Choice Between Risky Prospects: The Preservation of Comparative Statics Results
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem

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