A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining

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Publication:5289342

DOI10.2307/2298067zbMath0776.90092OpenAlexW2080745530MaRDI QIDQ5289342

Bhaskar Dutta, Kunal Sengupta, Debraj Ray, Kalyan Chatterjee

Publication date: 23 August 1993

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2298067




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