Costly Signalling in Auctions

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2007.00418.XzbMath1297.91080MaRDI QIDQ5293371

Johannes Hörner, Nicolas Sahuguet

Publication date: 2 July 2007

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (5)

Creating a winner's curse via jump bids ⋮ On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly ⋮ A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels ⋮ Preemptive bidding and Pareto efficiency in takeover auctions ⋮ Bidding frictions in ascending auctions

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