On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
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Publication:5293374
DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00421.xzbMath1297.91057OpenAlexW2151939563MaRDI QIDQ5293374
Publication date: 2 July 2007
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00421.x
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