EGALITARIAN DISTRIBUTIONS IN COALITIONAL MODELS

DOI10.1142/S0219198907001266zbMath1138.91305MaRDI QIDQ5294340

Javier Arin

Publication date: 24 July 2007

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuecoalitional gamesprenucleolusegalitarian criteria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (1)

Compromising in bifocal distribution games: the average value

Cites Work

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• The egalitarian solution and reduced game properties in convex games
• The general nucleolus and the reduced game property
• On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game
• Egalitarian solutions in the core
• The least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. Two values for TU games based on the excess vector
• Lorenz undominated allocations for TU-games: the weighted coalitional Lorenz solutions
• A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game

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