CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS UNDER AMBIGUITY: A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH

DOI10.1142/S0219198907001278zbMath1138.91382MaRDI QIDQ5294341

Fulvio Fontini, Marcello Basili

Publication date: 24 July 2007

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

exploitationChoquet expected utilityconstitutional constraintsgames with ambiguity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• On the use of capacities in modeling uncertainty aversion and risk aversion
• \(E\)-capacities and the Ellsberg paradox
• Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty: Breaking down backward induction
• Ambiguous games
• Non-additive beliefs and strategic equilibria
• Theory of capacities
• PROBABILITY AND UNCERTAINTY: THE LEGACY OF GEORGESCU‐ROEGEN
• Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
• A Simple Axiomatization of Nonadditive Expected Utility

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