BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION

DOI10.1142/S0219198907001308zbMath1138.91504OpenAlexW2019385807MaRDI QIDQ5294344

Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

Publication date: 24 July 2007

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198907001308

zbMATH Keywords

bankruptcy problemsmanipulation by mergingmanipulation by splittingTAL-family

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (1)

The reverse TAL-family of rules for bankruptcy problems

Cites Work

• Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
• Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods
• Distributive justice in taxation
• The proportional solution for rights problems
• A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
• Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
• Manipulation via merging and splitting in claims problems
• Inequality reducing properties of composite taxation
• ERRATUM: "BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION"
• On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk

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