The finer structure of resolute, neutral, and anonymous social choice correspondences
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Publication:529745
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2015.04.026zbMath1364.91049OpenAlexW2018828175MaRDI QIDQ529745
Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly
Publication date: 9 June 2017
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.04.026
Related Items (5)
Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules ⋮ Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences ⋮ Breaking ties in collective decision-making ⋮ Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited ⋮ Anonymous and neutral social choice: a unified framework for existence results, maximal domains and tie-breaking
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