On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2015.05.001zbMath1364.91065OpenAlexW1670601783MaRDI QIDQ529764

Alexey Kushnir

Publication date: 9 June 2017

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.05.001

zbMATH Keywords

correlationmechanism designdominant strategy implementationsurplus extraction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies ⋮ On linear transformations of intersections ⋮ On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities ⋮ Optimal Monopoly Mechanisms with Demand Uncertainty

Cites Work

• Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
• On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation
• Bayesian and Dominant-Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private-Values Model
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design

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