scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5490793

Publication date: 14 January 2009

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

Borda count majority vote positional voting rules ranking wheel Condorcet winer plurality vote reversal profiles

Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Social choice (91B14)

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