Towards a rigorous framework for studying 2-player continuous games

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2012.12.026zbMath1342.91002OpenAlexW2077217505WikidataQ50541876 ScholiaQ50541876MaRDI QIDQ530452

Shade T. Shutters

Publication date: 1 August 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.12.026

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryevolutioncontinuous prisoners dilemmacontinuous snow drift game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Gradual learning and the evolution of cooperation in the spatial continuous prisoner's dilemma
• Evolutionary dynamics of the continuous iterated prisoner's dilemma
• Patterns of cooperation: fairness and coordination in networks of interacting agents

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